Case Study 1: Weak Administrator Password
The YouTang Times vulnerability exposed nearly 400,000 user accounts, compromising their funds. (Source: https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2015-0126955)
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- YouTang Timesâs UCenter user management center (http://**.**.**.**/uc_server/admin.php) had a weak password (admin/123456). Login granted access to data for 400,000 users.
Security Recommendations:
- Admin backends should not be accessible from the internet.
- Avoid common URLs for admin backends, such as: /admin.phpă/admin/login.aspă/manage/index.html;
- Avoid common usernames for administrator accounts, such as: adminăadministratorăroot;
- Implement strong password rules, such as: minimum 8 characters, including at least 2 uppercase and lowercase letters, special characters, and numbers;
- Implement brute-force prevention mechanisms, such as: CAPTCHAs, account lockout after multiple failed login attempts;
- Implement two-factor authentication, such as: SMS verification codes, dynamic tokens.
Case Study 2: Weak Administrator Password + Outdoor LED Screen
High-risk vulnerability in Lijiangâs LED display information system allowed for the posting of advertisements (remote control over hundreds of LED screens).https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-076215
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- Lijiangâs LED display information system (http://**.**.**.**:8888/main.aspx) had a weak password (admin/123456), allowing for the broadcasting of arbitrary information to 169 outdoor LED screens across the city, negatively impacting the governmentâs image.
Security Recommendations:
- Same as Case Study 1.
Case Study 3: Weak Administrator Password + Video Surveillance System
Weak password in a municipal water bureauâs monitoring system allowed real-time monitoring through 366 cameras.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2015-0125288
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- The municipal water bureauâs network video surveillance system (http://**.**.**.**) had a weak password (admin/admin), allowing real-time viewing of footage from 366 surveillance cameras across the city.
Security Recommendations:
- Same as Case Study 1.
Case Study 4: Weak Administrator Password + Network Equipment
Weak password on network equipment at a municipal earthquake bureau.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-061840
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- A municipal earthquake bureauâs H3C switch (http://**.**.**.**:803/cn/login.html) had a weak password (admin/admin). Common exploitation methods included: 1. Packet capture and download to find account passwords and sensitive files; 2. Modifying ACLs to gain access to the internal network.
Security Recommendations:
- Same as Case Study 1.
Case Study 5: Weak Administrator Password + File Upload to Get Shell + Server Leaks Source Code and Password File
Weak password at a critical China Telecom branch allowed for gaining a shell (leaked large amounts of internal information and some source code).https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-075512
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- A China Telecom points mall operation platform (http://**.**.**.**:9002/Home/Index#) had a weak password (admin/123456). After logging into the backend, an arbitrary file upload vulnerability was used to upload a webshell, gaining operating system privileges. Reviewing the operating systemâs source code revealed 0-day vulnerabilities; reviewing password files and configuration files revealed numerous account passwords.
Security Recommendations:
- Same as Case Study 1.
Case Study 6: Weak Password for Regular User + OA System
Weak password at a COFCO location leaked large amounts of information.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2015-0126516
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- The COFCO OA system (http://**.**.**.**/seeyon/index.jsp) used weak passwords (123456, 111111) to crack common usernames, successfully obtaining numerous valid accounts. Login allowed access to the address book, retrieving personal information (name, department, position, rank, phone number, etc.) for all company employees;
- If the OA system had email functionality, it could send phishing emails with attachments. Once an employee clicked the attachment, the attacker could gain control of the employeeâs computer.
Security Recommendations:
- Implement strong password rules, such as: minimum 8 characters, including at least 2 uppercase and lowercase letters, special characters, and numbers;
- Implement brute-force prevention mechanisms, such as: CAPTCHAs, account lockout after multiple failed login attempts;
- Implement two-factor authentication, such as: SMS verification codes, dynamic tokens.
Case Study 7: Universal Account
SQL injection bypassed login on a Hisense Group system backend.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-081160
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- The Hisense Groupâs employee allocation system (**.**.**.**:8080/Web/transfer/login.asp), performance management system (http://**.**.**.**:8080/Web/performance/login.asp), and management standard query system (http://**.**.**.**:8080/Web/standard/login.asp) login forms had SQL injection vulnerabilities. A universal account (adminâ or âaâ=âa) could successfully log in, granting administrator privileges.
Security Recommendations:
- Admin backends should not be accessible from the internet.
- Avoid common URLs for admin backends, such as: /admin.phpă/admin/login.aspă/manage/index.html;
- Implement two-factor authentication, such as: SMS verification codes, dynamic tokens.
Case Study 8: Password Reset Vulnerability
Arbitrary user password reset on a dating app.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-074412
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- A dating appâs (http://**.**.**.**/) password reset interface (POST /data/user/password/reset) had three parameters (code=SMS verification code&mobile=phone number&password=new password). The SMS verification code was 4 digits and could be brute-forced, allowing for password reset and account access.
Security Recommendations:
- Implement brute-force prevention mechanisms, such as: CAPTCHAs, account lockout after multiple failed login attempts;
- Increase the SMS verification code to 6 digits, increasing brute-forcing difficulty;
- Limit the number of uses for each SMS verification code. After multiple incorrect attempts, a new code must be requested, with a waiting period before requesting another code.
Case Study 9: Password Reset Vulnerability
Resetting any userâs password on Tianjin Airlines (account security and sensitive information leak).https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2014-059947
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- Tianjin Airlinesâ ticket booking websiteâs password reset function (http://**.**.**.**/frontend/users/modifyinfo/resetPassword.jsp) involved three steps: entering the username, entering the password protection question answer, and resetting the password. In the second step, the backend sent the answer to the frontend, using JavaScript for verification. This allowed attackers to obtain the security question answer or modify the verification logic, resetting any userâs password and gaining account access.
Security Recommendations:
- Verify the password protection question answer on the backend.
Case Study 10: Password Reset Vulnerability
Modifying any userâs password on Hexun.com.https://wy.zone.ci/bug_detail.php?wybug_id=wooyun-2015-091216
Security Risk ăFixedăïŒ
- Hexun.comâs password recovery (http://**.**.**.**/getpassword_setnew.aspx) involved two steps: entering an email address, which sent a password reset link; clicking the link to reset the password. In the second step, clicking âResend Emailâ included the email address. This could be intercepted and modified to send the reset link to a different email address, allowing for password reset and account access for any user.
Security Recommendations:
- The frontend should not be able to control the recipient email address for password reset links.